Traditional Maritime Piracy Returns: Hormuz’s Rippling Effect on the Red Sea and Indian Ocean Security

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Category: Pirateria

Published on Monday, 01 June 2026 02:45

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Overview

Traditional maritime piracy, characterized by looting and armed robbery for ransom, has persisted along the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean coast since the collapse of Somalia’s centralized government in 1991. In the absence of a fully functioning government, the rise in maritime piracy is largely a reaction to foreign overfishing and the dumping of toxic waste in the region by local militia kingpins. Over the years, traditional pirates expanded their operations from merely protecting their territorial waters to hijacking international commercial vessels, which has become a highly lucrative venture since its early emergence in 1990s until 2011. Consequently, this escalation has raised significant maritime security concerns, endangering international sea trade for vessels passing through the Gulf of Aden and the Bab el Mandeb Strait. In response, the international community launched a combined maritime task forces (CTF 150, 151, 152 $ 153) to combat maritime piracy and protect disruptions in international maritime trade on the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Indian Ocean coasts. As a result, traditional piracy along the Somali coasts has experienced a notable decline.

The rise of the Houthi movement in the early 2010s, amid Yemen’s internal crisis and subsequent state decay, introduced a new form of maritime piracy. Although they existed along the eastern coasts of the Red Sea since Yemen’s crisis in early 2010s, their first major direct attack against international ships passing through the Red Sea occurred in November 2023. This variant, distinct from traditional ransom-driven piracy, is driven by political objective in the southern Red Sea region – one of the significant waterways on earth. The Houthis began disrupting international shipping in support of Palestinian freedom and later in solidarity with Gaza civilians suffering under Israel’s blockade. They hijack and attack commercial vessels and war ships using advanced weaponry, including unmanned aerial vehicles and missiles, escalating maritime piracy to a new level of severity. Unlike traditional piracy, this threat poses significant international concern.

In recent years, the Houthis have launched several attacks on vessels to exert pressure on Israel. They have conducted over 100 assaults against international commercial and war ships traversing the Bab el Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, compelling many vessels to reroute to Africa’s Cape of Good Hope, a much longer, arduous and costlier journey in terms of finance, logistics and security. In response, the international community formed a combined task force known as CTF 153 as part of the Combined Maritime Force (CMF) to combat piracy in the region. Additionally, with the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz, there is a growing risk that the Bab el Mandeb Strait could face a similar fate, given that the Houthis now control the largest corridor along the eastern coast of the Red Sea and Gulf pf Aden in the absence of a functioning government in Yemen. This might again force commercial vessels to reroute their way to Africa’s Cape of Good Hope. 

The Resurgence of Traditional Piracy along the Somalia Coast

The crisis in the Middle East and the subsequent de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz by the Islamic Republic of Iran, has led to a global energy crisis. This situation has also contributed to the resurgence of traditional piracy in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean coasts as demand for energy stabilization increases. Recent attacks by Somali pirates in these waters indicate that piracy has reemerged, partly because international naval forces previously deployed to combat piracy are now focused on stabilizing the Middle East – become thinner and diverged. This shift has created a vacuum, allowing pirates who had been dormant for some time to resume hijacking ships in this vital international waterway. Notably, Somali pirates have recently targeted larger commercial vessels for ransom, posing a dual threat to the already heightened global energy situation and significantly disrupting international maritime trade.

Compared to early piracy, current traditional piracy in Somali coast appears more coordinated and heavily financed. Modern pirates utilize fishing vessels and mother ships as launch points, allowing them to remain at sea for weeks before executing hijackings. They also seem to be demanding substantial ransoms for the safe return of their captives and the vessels without destruction. The ongoing disruptions in the Bab el Mandab Strait caused by the Houthis have given these traditional pirates opportunities to target ships rerouting to South Africa. Since the onset of the conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran, Somali pirates have attacked at least six large container ships (three successful hijackings and three attempted). They took crew members hostage and brought the containers to the Somali coast, demanding ransoms. To date, only a very small proportion of the ransoms demanded by Somali pirates have been paid and negotiations are still underway.

Implications

The resurgence of traditional piracy has significant implications for the already conflagrated international energy market, particularly due to the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz. This situation drives up insurance costs through increased risk premiums, expensive specialized coverage, and operational delays. Insurers impose additional charges to ship-owners whenever the area is classified as a high-risk zone for shipping. They also demand extra fees for kidnapping and ransom situations, as well as for boarding and rerouting when necessary.

Moreover, the troubling resurgence of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean is complicating international maritime patrols. As the conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran drags long, various Combined Task Forces (CTFs) are being redirected to address the Hormuz crisis. Consequently, the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean shipping routes are becoming increasingly vulnerable to traditional piracy.

Unlike Hormuz, rerouting has been feasible in the event of a blockade in the Bab El Mandeb Strait or the Suez Canal along the Red Sea-Mediterranean route. This alternative has been utilized on several occasions following Houthi attacks in the Red Sea since November 2023. However, this route is one of the most arduous, adding approximately ten days to transit times around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope and incurring additional security costs. It has effectively become the “Plan B” for the Red Sea maritime route. Compared to Hurmuz, possible closure in Bab el Mandab Strait or the Suez Canal has been possible for rerouting along the Indian Ocean coasts even with longer time and additional insurance costs for logistics and security.

The recent resurgence of traditional piracy along the 2,050-mile Somali coast in the Indian Ocean, however, poses a risk to rerouting maritime trade away from the Red Sea to Africa’s Cape of Good Hope, compounding the logistical and financial challenges already faced. Furthermore, this situation heightens pressure on the global supply chain, adding logistical, financial, and security costs to an already heightened global energy crisis due to rising oil and gas prices stemming from turmoil in the Middle East.

Worsening the matter, there seems to be a significant connection between traditional Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden and the Houthis further north in the Red Sea’s Bab el Mandab Strait. If this link is confirmed, it could severely disrupt international maritime trade, complicating maritime patrol efforts and limiting alternative routes for vessels traveling to Africa, Europe and Asia. This situation will eliminate the Indian Ocean coast, which served as detour when the Bab el Mandab strait is closed, leaving international maritime trade to Africa, Asia, and Europe without meaningful option. Together, these factors could have a crippling effect on global supply chains, particularly impacting least developed and landlocked countries like Ethiopia. These countries face “dual vulnerabilities” due to their low national energy reserves, heavy reliance on transit states, and the fact that their exports consist primarily of low-quality goods compared to their imports. Continuing to operate in the international market would be unsustainable for them, ultimately failing to provide social welfare and experiencing an internal economic crisis. 

Amare K. Aweke (PhD), Lead researcher and director general of Middle East and Asian Affairs department at the Institute of Foreign Affairs

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