Recordando la esperpéntica gestión de la catástrofe del "Prestige·
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- Published on Friday, 19 January 2024 19:20
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La España del inmenso trigal !Presente!
A pesar de las grandes diferencias entre las 70-74.000 t de chapapote vertidas por el "Prestige" contra las 25 toneladas de pelets procedentes del "Toconao", existen muchos factores en común, destacando por encima de todos ellos que ambos casos fueron gestionados por ingenieros navales carentes de formación y experiencia náutica. En el caso del "Prestige el entonces director General reconoció no saber lo que era el rumbo del barco. En el caso del "Toconao" la caída de contendores al mar se produce el día 8 de diciembre, en plena remodelación del Ministerio de Transportes, competente en la materia, pero el director General cesante, no hizo más que pasar de director General de la Marina Mercante a Secretario General de Transporte Aéreo y Marítimo y por lo tanto responsable del asunto del "Toconao"
El accidente del "Toconao" sigue vivo y lo seguirá por un tiempo. Han pasado días y semanas desde la caída de 6 contendores a la mar, pero el secretario General, se esconde como lo ha hecho siempre ante los accidentes marítimos que le afectaban directamente. Una buena prueba quizás de que reconoce su falta conocimientos para actuar como le corresponde a su cargo. Ha vuelto a repetirse la gestión esperpéntica, la falta de respuesta. Ni siquiera un aviso a los navegantes. Y ha tenido que ser el ministro el que ha tenido que dar la cara, pero evidentemente muy mal asesorado. A nivel regional, la Xunta de Galicia, ha hecho otro tanto de lo mismo: desconcierto, impotencia y cruce de acusaciones, mientras los pellets llegaban las costas gallegas y posteriormente rebasaban la Estaca de Bares para desembarcar en las playas de Asturias, Cantabria y el País Vasco.
Un panorama vergonzoso, propio de país de tam-tam y taparrabos. Sin embargo, el bipartidismo, erre que erre, abrazado al modelo "Prestige", negando a la Marina Civil y a los marinos civiles.
La teoría que todo el mundo vale para todo y que la tecnoburocrácia, a base de arrogancia y temeridad resuelve; es simplemente falso. ¿Cuántos vertidos más se necesitarán para que el bipartidismo rectifique, reconozca constitucionalmente a la Marina Civil y a los marinos civiles y se lo tome en serio?
Se recupera aquí el informe provisional elaborado por AEMC en 2005. Dado su carácter provisional tendrá algunos errores, pero será útil para aproximarse a lo ocurrido con el tristemente caso "Prestige"
CONTENTS
I COMMUNICATIONS 2
II THE CARGO 2
III THE SHIP 3
IV CAPTAIN MANGOURAS 3
V CLASSIFICATION SOCIETIES 5
VI THE ROUTE FOLLOWED BY THE “PRESTIGE” 6
VII THE LEAK 8
VIII FIRST SPILL 9
IX LISTING 10
X THE SPANISH CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR ACCIDENTAL MARINE OIL SPILLS 11
XI GOVERNMENT ACTION 13
XII MOBILIZATION OF SEA AND AIR RESOURCES 13
XIII SAR, MERSAR, COMSAR, IAMSAR, etc 14
XIV IMPROPER AND ABUSIVE USE OF HELICOPTERS 14
XV FEATURES OF THE RESOURCES MOBILIZED 15
XVI CONTRACTS OF THE SALVAGE TUGS 15
XVII PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF THE TUG OPERATIONS 16
XVIII NEGOTIATIONS BETWEN REMOLCANOSA-TECNOSUB-SMIT- SASEMAR 18
XIX IMPOSITIONS ON THE SALVAGE TEAM 19 XX EMERGENCY TOW 19 XXI EVACUATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CREW 20
XXII DIFFICULTIES OF EVACUATING THE MEMBERS OF THE CREW 20
XXIII CAPTAIN MANGOURAS COOPERATION 21
XXIV PROCEEDINGS AGAINST REMOLCANOSA 21
XXV INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT 23
XXVI INTERVENTION BY SERAFÍN DÍAZ 23
XXVII THE DECISION TO TAKE THE SHIP OFF 25
XXVIII THE ROUTE TAKEN: ONE OF THE MOST DANGEROUS 26
XXIX WEATHER CONDITIONS 27
XXX OMISSION, CORRUPTION AND MUDDLING OF DATA AND INFORMATION 27
XXXI THE ROLE PLAYED BY CERTAIN MEDIA 28
XXXII NUNCA MAIS (NEVER AGAIN) 29
XXXIII POSSIBLE LEGAL
RESPONSIBILITIES 29 Of the Spanish government 29 Of the Captain and other people related to owning and operating the ship. 30
XXXIV INVESTIGATION IN THE CENTRAL AND GALICIAN PARLIAMENTS 31
XXXV INVESTIGATION IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 31
XXVI REPRISALS 31
XXVII THE CREW OF THE “PRESTIGE” 32
XXXVIII FEATURES OF THE REPORTS DRAWN UP BY SASEMAR 32
XXXIX MARITIME ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE
XL.-FINAL RECOMMENDATION
INTRODUCTION.- THESE CONCLUSIONS MAY ONLY BE CONSIDERED AS PROVISIONAL.
The investigation into the accident suffered by the "PRESTIGE" is still in an immature phase. There is much evidence and many testimonies that must be collected before the investigation of the accident may be concluded.
I COMMUNICATIONS
1. The mayday was sent out by Captain Mangouras through the digital selective call (channel 70). It was properly formulated and sufficient to identify the call indicative (C6MMN6) of the petrol tanker “Prestige”, and to record the hour, date, exact position of the ship (l= 42 - 54N y L= 009 -54 W) and the situation of UNIDENTIFIED DANGER it was in.
The information contained in the message was also sufficient for identifying the dimensions and basic features of the ship (ship type, draught, width, horsepower, etc.) as well as identifying the owner. Therefore, the mayday sent out by the captain of the “Prestige”, was correct, both in format and content (GMDSS)
2. Over the different phases in the salvage operation, important deficiencies were brought to light in the communications systems and in the use made of them. As an example there is the saturation experienced by the emergency line 112 that lasted 29 minutes and that impeded the direct control of the helicopters that depended on the Xunta de Galicia.
3. The fact that the CZCS Finisterre (Zonal Control Center) had to establish communication bridges with the “Prestige” through the helicopters, confirms the deficient planning of communications.
4. There is no record that all the ships in the proximity of the “Prestige” and covered by the radar in the Control Center, had acknowledged receipt of the DSC sent out by the ship in distress. Only two of these ships actually acknowledged receipt.
It is not known if the Spanish authorities have taken any measures to clarify these matters or if any proceedings will be taken.
II THE CARGO 1.
The “Prestige” was correctly laden.
2. The fuel carried by the ship had been loaded into the holds at an average temperature of just over 50 degrees centigrade. The reduction in temperature after loading was produced slowly from the hull towards the center of the tanks.
This means that once on the bottom of the sea its temperature was far higher than the temperature for liquefaction of fuel that is about 6ºC and even higher than the temperature needed for solidification. Consequently, there is no reason to believe, as foreseen by the technical report provided by the Spanish Association of Naval Engineers, that the “Prestige” fuel could solidify on the sea bottom.
3. Due to its physical and chemical features, the fuel carried by the “Prestige” cannot evaporate nor be easily diluted by sea water. That is, it is a persistent hydrocarbon. If not extracted from the sea it will remain for a long time producing contamination.
4. The Spanish authorities knew from 08:04 (local time) in the morning of the 13th November, that the “Prestige” carried 77,033 metric tons of fuel-oil. III THE SHIP 1. The “Prestige” had no technical deficiency that could differentiate it from the thousands of ships allowed by the international community to navigate under “convenience” flags. At the beginning of 2003, approximately 60% of the world oil tanker fleet were navigating under convenience or assimilated flags. Five of these flags (Panama, Liberia, Cyprus, Bermuda and the Bahamas) covered nearly 43% of the whole oil tanker fleet. Their growth over the last few years have been nearly three times greater than the traditional flags.
2. The “Prestige” is a medium-sized “Clean Ballast Tank”. That is, an oil tanker that can carry in its ballast tanks, products that are acknowledged as “clean”.
3. Its condition, as judged by the photographs taken at the time, and its resistance during six days after the first leak was sprung, was satisfactory.
4. The “Prestige” was flagged out in the Bahamas. This is classified on the white list by the Paris Memorandum of Understanding. Its owner is registered in Liberia, the shipping company responsible for the real management of the ship, was an ad hoc company seated in Athens, Greece. The members of the crew included three nationalities although the majority were from the Philippines. This is the usual, legal schema adopted by the majority of merchant ships world-wide, oil tankers and others.
5. The “Prestige” business exploitation was carried out by the usual business framework. The freighter, Crown Resources, is a member of the Alfa Group, that defines itself as “one of the biggest financial and industrial aggregates of a private nature in Russia, with interests in the fields of hydrocarbons and other raw materials, commercial banking and investments, insurance, retail selling, food industry and telecommunications”.
Some companies in the group have had legal problems with the United Kingdom and have been accused by a prestigious British newspaper as having connections with the mafia. IV
CAPTAIN MANGOURAS 1. The master of the “Prestige” is a professional seafarer with a lot of experience in charge of oil tankers.
2. He has all his certificates up to date and therefore fulfilled all the legal requirements for being in charge of the ship. In spite of this fact, the rumor abounded that he was not sufficiently qualified. If there is any reproach due to Captain Mangouras it is that he was forced to continue working at the age of 67.
3. On analyzing the performance of the ship’s master, Apóstolos Mangouras, from the moment he heard the loud crash that rocked the Prestige at 15:10 hours on the 13th November 2002, up to the afternoon of the 15th, when he abandoned ship, we can only see a highly competent professional seafarer whose capacity and courage should have been worthy of society’s recognition. In the midst of the panic unleashed on board, with the tanker listing at wrecking speed while navigating southward through the vessel traffic separation device at Finisterre, facing a raging storm, Mangouras kept a clear mind and his courage resolute. Not knowing exactly what had happened, it would have been understandable if the captain had been indecisive while shuffling the different hypotheses: an explosion? Some sort of collision? A breaking wave? Had it come from outside or was there some sort of structural failure? However, in no way did he dither but, promptly and precisely adopted his decisions. Two of these decisions were questioned later by those who are trying to put the blame on him for the tragedy.
First of all the decision to ask the rescue services to evacuate the crew. If we look at the circumstances of the moment, the ship was listing to starboard 25 degrees, the engine was out and the ship was being pounded by eight meter high waves, then his decision is unquestionable. The members of the crew were therefore in danger of their lives since the ship would logically turn over under such circumstances.
Secondly we have the capacity of identifying the most immediate danger and face it in the most appropriate way. Mangouras observed the speed with which the ship was listing and deduced that the hull had sprung a huge leak through which about one thousand tons of water per minute was invading the ship. At the same time some of the tank covers had ceded and fuel was escaping from the tanks. There was a very real danger of the ship listing to a point of no return if the starboard-larboard weights continued unbalancing. Any fresh listing to starboard would take the ship over the transversal stability limit. Therefore, the most immediate problem to solve was to prevent or eliminate the list. But the engine was out and no boiler available for working the pumps to transfer cargo that would have corrected it.
So the captain gave the only order available to him which was that some men should open the deck valves to the port ballast tanks that were empty and intact, in order to flood them using gravity that should right the ship. The captain is not ignorant of the fact that the port tanks will become a stress on the ship’s structure but he is also aware that there would be time enough to correct this later. The priority was to overcome the immediate danger.
4. Captain Mangouras has been chosen as the scapegoat for the “Prestige” affair. a. There have been successive institutional smear campaigns. b. He was unjustly arrested and imprisoned. c. He was not treated properly during his arrest. 5. The treatment by the Spanish authorities to Captain Mangouras, opens up the discussion of what a captain’s attitude should be when faced by similar circumstances. If fulfilling: 1) the obligation to save the crew,
2) by all means avoiding the loss of the ship,
3) avoiding environmental pollution,
4) risking ones own life to avoid the salvage business going against the interests of the owner, Is punished by:
5) incompetent officials coming on board with no previous warning,
6) unverified accusations,
7) prison, humiliation, the imposition of millionaire bail,
8) having to sign the book at the police station in a foreign country, 9) having to suffer professional smearing, shipmasters will rather just abandon ship before having to go through all of this when faced with this kind of danger.
6. Current legislation allows shipping companies and similar to take decisions related to bills of lading, members of the crew, repairs, inspections, etc. without taking into account the technical know-how or asking for permission from the captain. However, whenever a problem crops up, related to such decisions the captain did not take, he is loaded with the responsibility and iseven put in prison.
There are many cases where the goods actually on the ship do not coincide with the description on the bills of lading and cargo lists. There are many cases where accidents are caused by the direct consequences of embarking crew members who do not have the necessary training and experience.
There are many cases where “agreements” mean that inspectors stamp as technically seaworthy, ships that have not been appropriately equipped, repaired or provided with the necessary resources.
There are many cases where shore-based personnel force their decisions on shipboard staff with threats of losing their job, that imply dangerous, illegal actions for which the captain must be held responsible.
V CLASSIFICATION SOCIETIES
1. At the time of the accident, the “Prestige” had all its certificates in order, both statutory and class. That means the ship had fulfilled all legal requirements to be able to sail.
2. The Classification Society that inspected the structures, equipment and operative systems of the ship is ABS, one of the most prestigious classification societies world-wide and is formally recognized by the European Union in accordance with community ruling. In fact, the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) had been asked by the Bahamas Government to provide the ship’s statutory certificates and today is the largest classification society that is recognized by over 110 countries for carrying out the inspections and certifications that are necessary for fulfilling the IMO agreements – particularly the provisions of SOLAS, load lines, and MARPOL. An analysis of ABS classifying and inspection activities show that 17% of the world merchant fleet and 24% of the oil tanker fleet are covered by them.
It is worth noting that the more than 9,000 ships classified by ABS are younger than the world average and that in the oil tanker sector their average age is hardly over the 15 years line, four years less that the world average in this sector.
3. The current system of inspection does not provide sufficient guarantees of quality and technical precision as the classifier is competing in an open market where the ship owner is the customer and as such is capable of choosing their classification society that puts unfair pressure on them.
This dependent relationship makes the results of the inspections questionable at least.
Controlling the technical conditions of ships fall on the State that flags it, according to international rules. Many of the flag states, all of those known as “convenience” flags, delegate providing all the certificates that should guarantee the safety of the ships and their compliance with the rules for avoiding marine environmental pollution to the classification societies that only provide private legal value to their inspections.
4. The “Prestige” called in to Spanish ports on several occasions over the last 5 years and there is no record that it was ever subjected to inspection, detention or recorded as having technical deficiencies.
5. “Vetting” type inspections are controls carried out by the companies contracting the oil tankers before closing the contract for freight. Although this could represent a reference point, it cannot be considered binding since it is linked with market based criteria.
6. As the Paris Memorandum of Understanding inspections are currently conceived (carried out with the ship afloat, by staff who do not have the appropriate resources for checking thickness, flection, etc. and with a limited amount of time for inspecting) it is not at all possible to detect structural deficiencies or weaknesses or deformities in the metal sheeting that make up the lining or other internal ship structures. The exception to this is when such deficiencies are visible on eye inspection or a specific complaint has been received in relation to them. In consequence the MOU is not the most reliable source for checking on the historical structure of the ship.
VI THE COURSE TAKEN BY THE “PRESTIGE”
1. At The moment of the accident, the “Prestige” was sailing along the Galician coast from Ventpils (Latonia) toward Gibraltar, “on orders”. This means that Gibraltar was a near reference in the course or route but not necessarily the final port for unloading
2. Even in the hypothetical case that Gibraltar was the destination port for the fuel carried by the “Prestige”, this would have no influence on the accident or the following catastrophe.
3. Both the sea route followed by the Prestige and its position throughout the Vessel Traffic Separation Device at Finisterre before the accident, perfectly fulfilled the international rulings on sea navigation.
4. The Zonal Center at Finisterre enjoys all legal attributes necessary for controlling sea traffic in the Vessel Traffic Separation Device at Finisterre as well as the internal waters nearby.
5. The Zonal Center at Finisterre has available all human and technical resources necessary for being aware of the exact position of the ship and to communicate with it at all times while it is within the field of action of their equipment.
6. The Zonal Center at Finisterre does not have legal attributes for ordering captains to act against their best professional judgment and certainly not to order them to abandon the navigation bridge in order to do tasks that should be done by a deck boy. However, this is what they tried to do with Captain Apostolos Mangouras.
7. If the Zonal Center at Finisterre may have had, did have, or has serious technical difficulties (over 50 minutes without real echoes) for seeing and representing by radar equipment the position of the ships within their field of action with the precision required by the IMO that is represented by real echoes, there should be a record of such deficiencies. If this is not the case, the Spanish authorities must justify the absence of such reliable data precisely in the time period of 18:00 to 19:00 hours that affected the collision between the “Ría de Vigo” and “Prestige” on the 13th November 2.002
VII THE LEAK 1.
The sinking of the “Prestige” was caused by a leak the origin of which is still unknown.
2. We do not know the exact size and position of the crack that sprung the leak. However, the speed with which the flooding occurred and the consequent list are indicative of the magnitude of the hole in the side.
3. Due to the fact it was under the water together with the condition of the sea at the time, it could not possible from any position, from the deck of the ship, or from the tugs, or from the helicopter, to evaluate exactly the characteristics and size of the crack or cracks opened up in the hull.
4. The sample of metal sheeting taken by the robot from the wreckage of the “Prestige”, presumably from the area of the crack, recorded a thickness of 20.5 mm that proves it fulfilled the technical requirements of the classification society.
5. It has not been proved that there was any direct relationship between the ship’s possible structural failure and the use of the ship as a storage house in the port of St. Petersbourg although this hypothesis is not to be discarded.
6. There are no technical reasons to discard the fact that the leak originated by collision with any half submerged object (a container for example) although this is not very probable. There is evidence to suggest that there were several very large tree trunks floating in the area.
7. The structural weakness of the ship that, combined with the impact of a large breaker, or having to suffer the stress caused by a very heavy sea, could explain the origin of the initial damage. There are several hypotheses that are not exclusive and that could be combined to explain it:
1. The investigation carried out by BEAmer ordered by the French Government that states that the building procedures in 1976 used for the “Prestige” were proved over time to provoke the appearance of weak points in the structure. Any of these weak points could have caused the damage. At the same time, the repairs carried out in May of 2001 in Canton only took care of certain parts of the structure leaving others as they were.
2. A second hypothesis on the origin of the structural weakness of the “Prestige” refers to the dilation and contraction stress suffered by the bulkheads and reinforcement elements due to changing temperatures between the cargo, heated to over 50ºC to keep it less viscose, and the outside of the sea water and the atmosphere that, at that time, was around 0º.
3. A third hypothesis refers to the weak points produced in a structure when new steel is combined with old steel. Certain accidents such as that of the Spanish ship “Luchana” that split up off the port of Avilés in 1984, are attributed to the derivation of structural stress caused by a huge repair job where parts of the old structure had new steel added to it. rtes de acero nuevo. To all of this we might add other conjectures referring to the quality of the repair done in Canton (On the “Prestige”), particularly related to the soldering, and the fatigue produced on the sides by the continuous stress suffered during loading in St. Petersburg and Ventspil by the use of ships and barges at close quarters and lastly, referring to the possible corrosion that may have gone undetected in certain metal sheeting of the side tanks used for clean ballast or simply to the fatigue of the same sheeting after 26 years at sea.
VIII FIRST SPILL 1. The first spill from the “Prestige” was produced through some hatches on deck (butterworth covers) because of effect of the listing experienced after the flooding of the clean ballast tanks on the starboard side (2pp and 3),
It was not produced, as it was led to believe, through the crack in the side since this only affected the clean ballast tank that, at that time, were empty. Captain Mangouras has provided a precise drawing detailing the hatches through which the fuel escaped into the sea.
2. The oil spill caused by the first leak had a perfectly visible size and shape and is very different to the origin of the continuous lines of fuel to be found later on. This shows that this initial spill was due to the excessive inclination of the ship and not to the loss of cargo through some hypothetical crack opened up in some cargo tank. Information provided by the rescue helicopter, the two tugs “Alonso de Chaves” and “Ría de Vigo”, together with the images supplied by the NNOA satellite, confirm the comments of the previous paragraph.
3. However, the Director General of the Merchant Navy has insisted on the breakage of a cargo tank as the origin of the initial spill. 4. Mangouras did consider in a first instance that the bulkhead separating the ballast tank from the central cargo tank may have broken. This possibility, with no chance of checking any structural damage, that was communicated in the first moments of the crisis, should have been confirmed later on by the experts as provided for in the Contingency Plan. However, this theory was never checked out for evaluating damage that would result by the Gvoernment authorities.
IX THE LISTING
1.- The list or inclination of the ship caused by the flooding – free entry of the sea – os the starboard clean ballast tanks could be corrected by any of the following operations: a) By transferring the cargo to 1 C since all the other tanks were filled to 98% capacity. According to the information available, the transfer would not be a viable option due to the following reasons (among others):
- Not enough crew members to carry out the connections needed. - Correction of the listing was an immediate need and it would have taken too long.
- Not enough power supply was available for the pumping operations.
b) Discharging cargo into the sea as covered by the Marpol agreement for emergencies.
This would have needed: - Pumping for which there was not enough power supply. - Expert Technicians of which there were none.
c) Flooding the clean ballast tanks placed in symmetry to the tanks flooded by the leak in the starboard side. Due to the circumstances at the time, the most viable solution and the most efficient was that taken by Captain Mangouras. However, the ballasting operation was not exempt of risk for the members of the crew who had to work the manual valves on the port side. In fact, one of them was very nearly washed overboard by the violence of the waves breaking over the ship.
d) Do nothing and wait to see what happens. A passive attitude would only have led to greater damage and, in consequence, greater risk for the safety of human life and pollution. It is obvious that the measures taken by Captain Mangouras submitted the “Prestige” to heavy stress. However, from among the different choices for the circumstances those he took were, without doubt, the most efficient as was proved by the righting of the ship. Later decisions taken by other authorities to not allow it in port that forced the ship to be submitted to a process of flexion-fatigue that resulted in tragedy.
X SPANISH CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR ACCIDENTAL MARINE POLLUTION
In spite of the fact that the Contingency Plan for Accidental Marine Pollution had been approved by Order communicated on the 23rd February 2001 and was in full force; In spite of the fact that in the introduction to the Plan mention is made of the experience accumulated over the years with oil spills at sea, either accidental or for other reasons, and that the factors of time and organization are of primordial importance for the success of any marine pollution combat action; In spite of the fact that under point 1.3.3 of the Plan, it is advised that:
“In all cases where the pollution is due to a shipping accident involving one or more ships, such as a collision, grounding or damage to the ship hull, the Spanish Plan will be activated, even when in such cases described, the resources available in the port, terminal or Autonomous Community affected by it are not sufficient to meet the requirements for combating the spill”; In spite of the fact that under paragraph
d) of point 1.5 it prescribes that a spill of polluting products into the sea from a ship in distress in Spanish jurisdictional waters must be dealt with by the Spanish Plan in the first instance and, if there is a risk of the pollution reaching the coast, territorial contingency plans will be activated corresponding to the affected area; In spite of the fact that under paragraph
e) of point 1.6.1 it prescribes that when both the countrywide and territorial plans are activated together, a governing body must be formed by the Government Representative for the Autonomous Region and the Director of the Territorial Contingency Plan so activated; In spite of the fact that under paragraph e) of point 1.6.1 it is prescribed that in such a case that the nationwide Plan is activated, the center of operations must be organized in the SASEMAR Regional Coordination Center for Maritime Rescue and Pollution Control (CRCS-LCC) corresponding to the area affected by the accident; In spite of the fact that under paragraph 2.1.1), relating to ACTIVATION MECHANISMS OF THE SPANISH PLAN it is prescribed that this is activated by the regional maritime authority responsible for the area where the accident occurs (in this case A Coruña); In spite of the conclusions obtained from exercises, drills and simulations done in the area for similar circumstances to those suffered by the “Prestige”.; In spite of all these expert, tried provisions, the decisions made for this specific case were made on personal criteria by the Director General of the Merchant Marine basing these on his own perceptions of a confused structure. 1. According to his own statements, the Director General of the Merchant Marine took upon himself the organization, planning and management of the operations in a completely personal way.
2. There is no record that he asked for technical advise from personnel with experience in oil tankers either within the Directorate General for the Merchant Marine or related organs, as he himself stated. He made his decisions totally ignoring the actions provided for in the order communicated on the 21st February 2002 in which the Spanish Contingency Plan was approved. 3. The personal character imposed on the decision making completely detracted from the provisions of the contingency plan and nullified the actions of the professional organizations mentioned in that plan. These professional bodies were relegated to mere masquerade.
4. External assistance from captains and engineers who were experts in oil tankers was not asked for at any time. It was decided not to send the A Coruña Chief Inspector and other qualified technicians to the “Prestige”, who were replaced by Serafín Díaz.
XI GOVERNMENT ACTION
1. In relation to the “Prestige”, the Spanish State was faced with several concurrent, parallel obligations: save human lives in danger (carried out satisfactorily), avoid the loss of the ship, avoid the loss of the cargo, protect the marine environment (none of which was done with no apparent justification for such non-compliance). It is not possible to claim “force majeur” since none of the elements characterizing such an eventuality were present (unforeseeable, inevitable or overwhelming). Right from the start the government resorted to falsehood, misleading information, black propaganda and the spinning of responsibilities by means of press releases orchestrated through the television (specially the state-owned TVE) where emphasis was made in the volunteers (whose merits are not questioned) and information relating to the situation and real displacement of the oil spills and the measures adopted to combat them were avoided.
2. Biased versions were distributed of Captain Mangouras actions that were later denied when the transcriptions of the recordings taken by the CZCS at Finisterre were published. 3. The civil servant sent to the ship was treated as a national hero but after time, the research carried out to date has shed doubt on his role on board and specifically on the foundation and truth of his declarations.
XII MOBILIZATION OF SEA AND AIR RESOURCES
1. From the information provided by SASEMAR and the regional government (Xunta de Galicia) it can be appreciated that there was a considerable lack of meticulousness when mobilizing the air and sea units that should, theoretically, carry out the tasks of towing, rescue and marine pollution combat. Many of the sea units used did not come up to the minimum standards required for towing a ship such as the “Prestige”.
2. Some of the tugs mobilized did not even try to tow the tanker. Such was the case of the “Ibaizabal I” and “Pau da Luz”.
• Others at least tried but failed. An example was the “Charuca Silveira” and, to a lesser degree, “Sertosa 32”.
• The time spent by some of the tugs to reach the objective may be qualified as excessive. The “Charuca Silveira” took approximately 15 hours to travel the distance from Vigo to Fisterra.
• Others had their own troubles while trying to get there: “Sertosa 32” suffered a breakdown on the way toward the “Prestige”, and it must be recorded that it did a good job within the limits of its possibilities.
• Others were found under repair without the knowledge of SASEMAR and were unnecessarily mobilized hours later, such as in the case of the “Pau da Luz” 3. Keeping in mind that there were available ideal units for locating, identifying and controlling fuel spills, such as planes, helicopters and specialist ships for pollution control, and also taking into account the state of the sea, the cost involved and inefficiency of mobilizing tugs for the purpose of spill detection, this must only be considered unjustifiable. 4. Available resources were badly used. The public tug “Alonso de Chaves”, that is more powerful than the “Ría de Vigo”, was mobilized while it was in Asturias. It arrived on the scene on the 14th at 13:30 when the “Ría de Vigo” had not yet managed to fix a tow line and before the “Prestige” engine had been started up. However, the “Alonso de Chaves” was not ordered to tow the “Prestige” and instead was sent to look over the draughts and possible leaks of fuel and then it was sent to the Port of Corcubión. Instead, the Tug Mahón belonging to the Navy was mobilized but could not answer the call as it was out of service. XIII SAR, MERSAR, COMSAR, IAMSAR, etc The action taken by the Spanish authorities in relation to the planning, operations and management of the rescue of human life and pollution combat/control should be analyzed based on the content of the agreements and instruments currently in force. There are valid arguments to show that they did not follow the guidelines contained in such documents. Just one of the unethical events of the operation is the fact that the “Ría de Vigo” tug signed a private rescue contract with the owner in spite of it being exclusively assigned to Sasemar. Such exclusiveness denies any possibility of its capacity of signing private contracts for carrying out what is considered a public service.
XIV IMPROPER AND ABUSIVE USE OF HELICOPTERS
The helicopters were mobilized ignoring the rules and guidelines established by IAMSAR and other applicable instruments for the rescue of human life at sea: - No action plans were made up either global or specific. - Crews’ rest times were not respected.
- The helicopters were used on more than one occasion for visits, including accompanying family members.
XV FEATURES OF THE RESOURCES MOBILIZED
1. Keeping in mind the size and the state of the “Prestige” structure, the conditions of sea, wind and the sea currents in the area, and that the tug “Ria de Vigo” enjoys an extremely advantageous annual tug contract (for example: the area it has assigned to it has the greatest volume of incidents) compared to any other public tug – even when these are greater in capacity (power).
The “bollard pull” certificate for the " Ría de Vigo" has not been made public. However, there is a well-founded suspicion that the strength contracted by the owner of the “Prestige”, 125 Tn. – is not in line with the information published by Remolcanosa, and would probably not coincide with a trial to calculate its effective pulling strength.
XVI CONTRACTS OF THE SALVAGE TUGS
1. The contracts signed between SASEMAR and Remolcanosa, in relation to the “Ría de Vigo”, highly favor the private company, Remolcanosa, in detriment to the public entity Remasa, that is under SASEMAR. This situation is costing the taxpayer money who becomes the financing agent of such contracts since 95% of the economic benefits from the towing and rescue operations carried out are managed and collected by Remolcanosa. 2. To our understanding, the justification of the costs incurred by these tugs do not follow any minimum meticulousness. 3. Although the “Ría de Vigo” has been contracted to work exclusively for the Spanish Governmental Agency for Maritime Rescue and Pollution Control (SASEMAR), Remolcanosa signed a contract with A Dutch company – SMIT – who again negotiated and contracted with the owners of the “Prestige”. Apart from the legal implications this caused a long delay before the first try at towing was done.
4. The contract with “Ría de Vigo” is not meticulous in, among others, the following matters: professional quality of the crew number of crew members procedures for tow roping It is particularly surprising that no specific mention is made of the bollard pull parameters of the “Ría de Vigo”.
5. It is not the first time that the “Ría de Vigo” has been the main player in unjustified delays and alarm in the town of Muxia. An example of this type of incident is that referring to the Algerian gas tanker, “Rabadame Abane”, that was also allowed to drift toward Muxia with an unexplainable passivity on the part of the “Ría de Vigo”. Another case, after the “Prestige”, is that of the French ship “Pointe du Castell” suffering an incident on the 20th November 2002 in the Traffic Separation Device at Finisterre.
6. Getting back to the “Prestige”, the authorities did not inform, at any time, either Captain Mangouras or the owner of the “Prestige” that the tug operations were free of charge as they were included in the search and rescue and pollution control contingencies provided for in the Spanish plan for protecting human life at sea and their coastline – even though the obligation of providing such information is included in Spanish law. 7. The contracts signed between Xunta de Galicia and Remolcanosa imply an even greater level of absurdity, specially in relation to the requirements demanded of the crew members.
XVII PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF THE TUG OPERATIONS
1. The fact of the matter is that the tug operations had absolutely no planning at all and this is shown by the following:
a) No information was required of the “Prestige” Captain in relation to the characteristics and conditions of the emergency tow needed, or to the condition of the ship’s deck, or of the mooring elements, or of those related to connections and protection elements on board such as chains, shackles, hawsers, sheeting, etc.)
b) In spite of the fact that all the decision making entities such as SASEMAR, CNCS, CECOP, Maritime Captaincy for Coruña and the CZCS all knew that the crew of the “Prestige” would be evacuated, no measures were taken to embark by the same means any technical personnel who could facilitate the mooring operations for the tow ropes. On the other hand it was decided to first put pressure on the Captain, First Officer and Chief Engineer to abandon ship. Then they were asked to do the job of deck boys in the stead of the personnel that should have been sent by the salvage company.
2. The Minister of the Merchant Marine surely should have known that if they forced the Captain to abandon the bridge in order to do mooring work, they would not only be degrading and vexing him but at the same time all communications with shore would be lost.
3. The continued requests of Captain Mangouras to send technicians to do the mooring line work were ignored.
4. The Minister of the Merchant Marine knew, or should have known, that the current union agreement for the company Remolcanosa, owner of the “Ría de Vigo”, expressly mentions the presence on board a ship in distress of crew members who would be in charge of different tasks including that of mooring the towlines.
5. He also knew, or should have known, that the amount of the prize for the “Ría de Vigo” would be several million euro, meaning it was not necessary to force the Captain and officers to stay on board in order to carry out mooring jobs that were the responsibility of the towage firm.
6. However, it was not until many hours after mobilizing the tugs that measures were taken to send personnel to the ship to secure the towlines.
7. There is no record that the Captain of the ”Ría de Vigo” was informed that the tug under his command had been contracted by SMIT to assist the “Prestige”. In other words, the tug operated under two simultaneous contracts without the Captain having any knowledge of this circumstance.
8. All the data available show that, as soon as the towlines were made firm, the “Prestige” was taken on a course to get it as far out to sea as possible, regardless of the difficulties. The “Ría de Vigo” took a course of 320 that was directly toward the open sea. That is, toward a storm tossed area that punish the area under the influence of squalls known as the “Canadian train”.
9. The course taken and ordered to “Ría de Vigo” does not take the ship in distress to a port or refuge that were not within reach under 24 hours or even several weeks and under these circumstances the guidelines established by the IMO should be kept in mind.
10. The Captain of “Ría de Vigo”, who is the person responsible for the towing operation, did not ask for information on the characteristics of the ship to be towed nor did he adopt the most appropriate measures for making a firm towline.
11. Taking into account the extension of the ¨trip to no-where" imposed by the Minister of the Merchant Marine General on the “Prestige”, it is obvious that the crew of the “Ría de Vigo” did not follow the ruling of the current STCW/ 95 convention.
12. The personal equipment provided to the crew of “Ría de Vigo” does not fulfill the minimum safety rules for protection: helmets, harnesses, etc.
13. The method decided on by the Captain of “Ría de Vigo” of “leading towage” ended up as an impossible exercise as proved by the results - taking into account; the weather conditions, the height of the “Prestige” fore-castle in respect of the “Ría de Vigo” deck, the size of the “Prestige”, not having enough power to move the towage train and the lack of seamen on the deck of the “Prestige”, added to problems with language.
14. It is surprising that alternative measures were not taken in view of the successive failures in securing a towline before it was imminent that the “Prestige” would reach Muxía.
15. From a purely professional point of view, it is inadmissible that the protection of the Galician coasts, in relation to sea rescue, should still be mainly dependant on the “Ría de Vigo”, especially since this is not the first time that there has been a situation marked by negotiation, delay and failure in securing the towline, similar to that suffered in the case of the “Prestige”. XVIII NEGOTIATIONS BETWEN REMOLCANOSA- TECNOSUB-SMIT- SASEMAR 1. The data available confirm that, at the time of the accident, the tug “Ría de Vigo”, belonging to Remolcanosa, was under a contract of exclusivity with SASEMAR. 2. In spite of the existence of this contract of exclusivity, right in the middle of the emergency with the “Prestige”, negotiations were held between the interested parties and with the knowledge of SASEMAR. 3. The tug “Ría de Vigo” was contracted by the ship operator under the LOF formula. Therefore, the “Ría de Vigo” now found itself simultaneously working for SASEMAR and SMIT, this last being the salvage company contracted by the “Prestige”s operator. 4. Evidence exists that shows that it was not the first time that Remolcanosa- Smit had signed this kind of contract. 5. When the DGMM decided to send the “Prestige” into the storms that circulate around Galicia at that time of year, they knew the LOF was in force. Therefore, the decision to send the ship away and the aim of the contract were in opposition to each other. 6. Keeping the aforesaid in mind, both Remolcanosa and SASEMAR should provide public explanations in answer to the petitions made to them over the last 10 years because of their interventions in rescue operations and justify the distribution of prizes as practiced based on such operations. XIX IMPOSITIONS ON THE SALVAGE TEAM 1. The Spanish authorities should justify the delay experienced by the SMIT rescue team in embarking. 2. The Spanish authorities made it a pre-requisite to embarking that the SMIT rescue team should sign a document presented to them by the A Coruña Harbour Master. This document imposed on the team the following conditions, among others: - That the “Prestige” be taken out 320 nautical miles from the Spanish coast - That the SMIT captain take command of the ship 3. The document is written in Spanish and signed by the rescue captain and SMIT agent. XX EMERGENCY TOW 1. The emergency tug fulfilled the legal requirements established in international ruling and was technically guaranteed by the certificates emitted by ABS.
2. Based on the above-mentioned ruling, it should have been operational within 25 minutes.
3. From the moment the accident occurs up to the time the “Prestige” crew is evacuated by the helicopters, the aft deck, where the emergency tug is stowed, was totally awash in fuel-oil and the sea was breaking violently over it. Any effort to launch that tug would have been dangerous.
4. The Spanish authorities had serious difficulties to identify as an emergency tug, the circular device installed on the aft deck and this may be the origin of certain unfounded accusations. In fact, the tug “Alonso de Chaves” did the towing as soon as the emergency tug had been made fast.
5. The operations of taking on the towing should be investigated in greater detail because on the aft wing there are, perfectly visible, a group of mooring ropes, tied to the railing and with imperfections and even complete breakage at some points. This indicates that an effort was made to tow from aft although this is not recorded in the corresponding books.
XXI EVACUATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CREW
1. Taking into account the swift listing of the ship, the panic that such an event provokes in the majority of the members of the crew together with the storm in which the “Prestige” found itself at the time of the accident, the evacuation ordered by Captain Mangouras was not only fully justified but is the only sensible measure he could possibly take.
2. The crew rescue operations were carried out with complete professional efficiency, except in that concerning the order in which they abandoned ship.
3. The Spanish authorities were aware of the evacuation of the “Prestige” since helicopters from Sasemar and the Xunta de Galicia were involved.
XXII DIFFICULTIES EVACUATING THE MEMBERS OF THE CREW
1. According to information published in the media, the commander of Helimer Galicia (helicopter) ordered Captain Mangouras and the two officers with him, to abandon ship.
2. It is yet to be clarified if the commander of Helimer Galicia acted ”motu proprio” when giving this order or whether it came from higher up.
XXIII CAPTAIN MANGOURAS COOPERATION
1. Looking at the information available, Captain Mangouras at all times cooperated fully with the CZCS Finisterre and the Spanish authorities. He acted in the most professional manner possible and risked his life in order to avoid the pollution of the sea and defend the interests of the owner he represented. His actions addressed saving the lives of the crew, saving the ship and the cargo as well as doing everything in his power to avoid an oil spill.
2. The Law of 25th March 1999, under which the prices for services provided by Sasemar are fixed, declares in the introduction that the public service of rescue of human life at sea and maritime pollution combat will be free of charge.
3. Under article 2 of said law, no price is payable for functions carried out by Sasemar as detailed below:
a) those actions that constitute a public service of the rescue of human life at sea and of combating pollution in the marine environment. Taking all of this into consideration and keeping in mind that is was precisely SASEMAR, by means of Finisterre Radio, who insisted to the Captain that he should take on a tug because the ship was polluting and very near the coast, there inevitably arises the question that ought to receive a clear answer in order to remove all doubt: Why was the captain of the “Prestige” not informed that the tug services so required were completely free of charge? How is it that, according to the documents published, a towing contract was negotiated and signed? This Association considers that these questions are not only of interest in the case of the “Prestige” but also for future actions by the units of maritime rescue and pollution control and should therefore be answered appropriately by the Ministry.
XXIV PROCEEDINGS AGAINST REMOLCANOSA
1. The Ministry responsible announced and justified the opening of proceedings against the owner of the tug “Ría de Vigo”, before the Congress on the 10th December 2002, due to a possible non-compliance of their contract.
2. According to the declarations of the Minister: a. “Ría de Vigo” is a tug belonging to Remolcadores Nosa Terra S.A, with headquarters in Vigo. b. It is the object of a contract for total freight services where this unit is destined to the public service of maritime search and rescue (of human life), salvage (of ships/cargoes) and of combating pollution at sea – covering the national coastline on the north Atlantic zone of the Peninsula, being strictly commanded to adhere to the conditions written in the private administrative clauses and the technical descriptions (of the contract) and that form the basis of their receiving the contract by the contracting institution, Sasemar. c. Paragraph 3.1 of the last clause of the technical description explicitly states that the response of the unit to petitions for the service will be immediately and, under no circumstances, more than 20 minutes, provided – between 09:00 and 17:00 during the day and 30 minutes between 17:00 and 09:00 of the following day. d. Paragraph 3.7 establishes that the contractor may ask for the contract to be changed in order to substitute the ship covered by the contract, for another of similar characteristics without any changes in the original contract. This request must be done in writing at least 15 days in advance. e. From all of this one may deduce the need to obtain authorization with at least 15 days in advance. This implies that the tug, provided exclusively for servicing the needs of SASEMAR, may not be ceded for other services, precisely in case of an immediate emergency. Even if permission may be obtained from SASEMAR before the said time of 15 days this would still mean that the contract would be violated. f. The tracking document provided by the Coordination Centre in Finisterre shows that from the 21:00 hours of the 13th, the representative of Smit in Coruña: Finisterre Agencia Marítima, had reached an agreement with the owner that this last would give instructions to Captain Mangouras to take on the tug “Ría de Vigo”. This means: 1. That at that time, there was not only an agreement between Smit and the owner of the “Prestige” but that there was also an agreement between “Ría de Vigo” and Smit. 2. That there is no record in the Ministry that SASEMAR was aware of such agreements at that time. Therefore the owner of “Ría de Vigo” could clearly have incurred a violation of contract and this is the reason that the State Lawyers in A Coruña is in charge of taking legal proceedings against them.
3. In spite of the declarations of the Ministry and the conclusive nature of the reasons given, 14 months after having provided such manifestations, there is still no record that the matter has been settled. 4. In spite of the declarations of the Ministry, SASEMAR had effective knowledge of the negotiations between SMIT-Remolcanosa and the owner of the “Prestige”
XXV INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT
1. Since the Spanish State was directly involved in the accident-catastrophe of the “Prestige”, it was the Spanish authorities who should, based on current legislation, carry out an official investigation into the circumstances surrounding it.
2. There is no record that any such investigation was carried out in compliance with the guidelines and contents published by the IMO in respect of this kind of investigation.
3. The results of the investigation should have been made public in order to, at least in part, contribute to the purging of responsibilities and to avoid a repetition of a catastrophe of this nature.
XXVI INTERVENTION BY SERAFÍN DÍAZ
In reference to Serafín Díaz, it is advisable to underline that:
- He is a civil servant who rose to the equivalent of Harbour Master in A Coruña from Assistant Inspector, without having passed the corresponding examinations that the members of the Special Civil Marine Corps should do.
- That, after accessing the Civil Marine Corps he was made civil servant by other means. - That his knowledge of the English language is insufficient.
- That he is charged under several proceedings with presumable irregular behavior while employed in the civil service. - Because of his limitations in the English language and in technical matters, he was not a Paris MOU inspector.
- That he was sent to the “Prestige” with the exclusive order to start up the main engine. - That he embarked on the ship without the knowledge or authorization of the Captain.
- That he gave himself authority to give orders to the crew of the “Prestige”, specifically to start up the engine. - That he even threatened the Chief Engineer with bringing in the armed forces.
- That he did not write up any act or report to explain his actions on board the ship.
- That the Captain of the “Prestige” had no choice in either accepting or rejecting what Serafín declared.
- That the Captain of the “Prestige” was not even able to know what Serafin had declared when they got to shore.
- Due to his language limitations, Serafin would not have been able to communicate with Captain Mangouras, or even to write up a report in English.
- Serafin said he could not see the tugs, which was not true. He also said he had seen the crack in the side, which was also not true.
- There is no evidence that he had inspected the ship at all, nor its structural condition at any time.
- There is no evidence that he had expressed a technical opinion about the propriety or otherwise of ballasting the port ballast tanks as a measure to correct the listing produced by the leak.
- That after this accident, Serafín Díaz was promoted to Harbour Master of A Coruña.
- That in this office of Harbour Master, he once more took the lead in significant cases such as those involving : “SM Spiridon” (he mistakes the dung from cattle cleaning as oil and arrests the ship); “Histria Hemerald” (he impeded an inspection), “BO II” (authorizing its setting out in spite of having a complaint filed against it) & “Gerión” (seemed to be a ship providing services without the appropriate certificates).
All of which is proof of his manner and professional quality.
XXVII THE DECISION TO TAKE THE SHIP OFF
1. There are good reasons to believe that the decision to remove the ship out to sea was taken on the 13th November without the Spanish authorities having carried out any kind of inspection of the state of the “Prestige”. 2. Official, public and private media communicated to public opinion the information about the cdecision to take the ship off. Proof of this is in the press notes provided by the Ministry and the Galician Government Delegation, as well as the declarations of Serafín Díaz and the Harbour Master of A Coruña. 3. To the first error of sending an oil tanker out to sea, during the stormy season, when structurally damaged and full of a contaminating product, we have to add the course chosen. This course directed the ship directly toward the storm that propitiated the breaking up of the ship with the consequential and inevitable pollution. At the same time taking it to where the wind and currents could easily carry the oil spills toward the coast. It is well known that no matter how far you take a ship from the coast, if it breaks up to the west or northwest of Galicia, the pollution will end up on the coast. 4. No-one is questioning for a moment the authority of the coastal states for adopting the measures they feel are right in order to avoid damage to their coasts, but on exercising that authority there should not be such total contempt toward the authority of the ship and much less the ignorance of the flag state and the application of decisions lacking the most elemental common sense. The opinions of the Captain and the Chief Engineer are ignored.
They are given orders and are threatened. Therefore, for example, their alternative of taking the ship to a safe refuge was not taken into account even though it would have been less dangerous for all the interests concerned: environment, ship owner, danger to the rescue staff and resources, pollution combat – when compared to sending out a damaged ship into the storm.
5. The government is in its right to send the ship away, but to reach that decision they should first have evaluated the characteristics of the damage to the ship and to analyse the possible risk of spilling the cargo (working document of the Sub-committee of Navigation Safety of the Maritime Safety Committee of the IMO – July 2002; and the conclusions of the simulation carried out Sasemar with “Galicia 2001” where the supposition involved a collision between an oil tanker and a passenger ship near to A Coruña). No data exist to prove that any technical evaluation was carried out of the damage to the “Prestige”. The decision to take the ship away was probably made based on a pre-judice: that of getting the problem as far from the election feud of the party in government apart from their characteristics and the consequences the measure may have.
6. Both inside and outside Spanish waters, there have been cases where an oil tanker with structural problems have been taken into port. Such is the case of the Spanish tanker “Ildefonso Fierro”. This ship took refuge in the Seno de Corcubion and later unloaded in the Port of A Coruña. (1976)
XXVIII THE ROUTE TAKEN: ONE OF THE MOST DANGEROUS
1. The course that the Spanish merchant navy authorities decided on, was probably one of those with the greatest risk, for the following reasons:
a. It led directly to the North part of the Traffic Separation Device at Finisterre, that increased the risk of collision.
b. The ship is submitted to a continuous flexion stress.
c. The danger for crew and rescuers is increased to the same measure as the ship’s distance from shore. At the same time helicopter efficiency in providing help is reduced.
d. The rip in the side increases in function of the length of time the ship is submitted to the worst possible stress.
e. As the ship goes farther away the focus of polluting cargo dispersion increases the propagation fan of such pollution.
f. The waves are more intense the farther out you go from the coast.
g. The initial course for getting the ship away from the coast was changed on the 15th, and from this moment it was sent S. In this way the “Prestige” found itself on the 16th some 25 nautical miles W of the place it had originally sent out the SOS. Between 1400 hours on the 13th and 1200 hours on the 14th the distance of the “Prestige” from the Seno de Corcubión was at all times less than 20 nautical miles. In the early hours of the 14th the “Prestige” came to within 12 nautical miles from Cabo Finisterre (that is at the mouth of the Seno de Corcubión)
XXIX WEATHER CONDITIONS
1. The accident of the “Prestige” and the later developments that ended in the biggest shipping-coastal catastrophe in the history of Spain, happened during certain weather conditions that varied from extremely harsh through moderate to very good. This is due to the fact that at that time of year wind and sea evolve with the low pressure areas that mean variable conditions may be expected. Thus there was the storm raging on the 13th in the morning and softer conditions that very night. The forecasts, warnings, video images and information collected from different official sources confirm such extreme conditions. The information provided on the spot by the tugs also confirmed these changes in the weather.
2. Whatever the weather, it must be remembered that the intensity of the waves diminishes the nearer one gets to the coast.
XXX OMISSION, CORRUPTION AND MUDDLING OF DATA AND INFORMATION
1. As admitted by the Director of the CZCS to the judge, and easily proved by the sequential gaps and other, similar inconsistencies, the records in the zonal center do not record all the orders, conversations, information and data relating to the management of the accident.
2. Much of the missing information is essential in order to reconstruct and evaluate what had really happened at the time.
3. The log of the tug, “Ría de Vigo” shows irrefutable proof of the “palming” of essential data in order to understand the actions of the tug at the time. None of the data referring to watches, situation, start of manoeuvres, nor those relating to the coordination of other smaller craft and tugs that were there at the time the tug operations were carried out had been recorded. The deliberate omission of information that is required by law was suddenly broken from the moment the towline is made firm. From that moment on all the information in relation to position , changes in course and so on was recorded. Since the “Ría de Vigo” was acting “de facto” as delegated authority on the scene of the accident, this absence of duly recording the information is more surprising and very serious.
XXXI THE ROLE PLAYED BY CERTAIN MEDIA
1. Information was not reported and a good part of what was reported had been manipulated for certain “interests”.
2. Not only did certain private and public media accept that information as valid, they became the most credible sources of information given out by the national and autonomic authorities.
3. The information model put into practice was that typical of the time of Franco where all the media transmitted the same message even while using different language to communicate it. Emphasis was made in the work done by the volunteers, in all the resources provided by the government to facilitate their work (tents, clothing, food, etc.) which made the new report irrelevant since its intention was to minimise the consequences while magnifying the results.
Later on we got the information about how soon the government would indemnify those affected and stressing incidents in the past when this diligence was not practiced.
4. It would be advisable that the media should have reporters on the payroll who are experts in shipping related matters.
5. The media in general were manipulated in such a way as to become a true institutional support against the protests and particularly against the popular cry expressed through “Nunca Mais”
XXXII NUNCA MAIS (NEVER AGAIN)
The “Nunca Mais” platform has channelled the popular cry against the catastrophe of the “Prestige” and its consequences, in Spain and outside of Spain, but particularly in the area of Galicia.
The accusations that have been made against “Nunca Mais” should be inscribed in the chapter of slander for interest.
XXXIII POSSIBLE LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES Of the Spanish government
1. In accordance with criminal criteria, the Spanish Government is circumstantially the main guilty party in the Prestige catastrophe in the sense that their behaviour is more serious than that of the others involved.
2. The crimes imputed to the Spanish authorities could be: a. Firstly, there is what is commonly called a “ecological crime” or “pollution crime” in the negligence version (article 325 of criminal law code in relation to the crime of article 331).
b. Secondly, there is a crime against the environment, compatible with the previous one, specifically of damage to a “protected natural space”, also in its negligence version (art. 330 in relation to 331).
c. Thirdly it would be possible to add the crime of damage due to negligence (art. 267), that is also compatible with the other two in the measure that the oil spill did not only have an effect on the ecology (judicial interest of the whole community) but also of the individual patrimony of people: thinking of damage caused to boats, water-treatment plants, fish-farms, fishing tackle, etc.
3. Of such crimes the authors would be all those people who had contributed to putting the environment in danger or of causing such ecological and patrimonial damage as long as their contribution “configures the sense of the real course objective and positively” According to the information we have to hand, main responsibility would fall primarily on the Director General of the Merchant Navy. What is more, under article 325 there is included the concept “extensive to author” meaning that all those may be punished for the crime considered authors, being those who had carried out any action that may materially constitute simple participation and that with a “strict concept of author” would not be sanctioned due to negligent behaviour. In this way all those behaviours or actions such as mistaken calculation of the ship’s draught, assurance that the ship would be able to take on the storm without breaking up, guarantee that the fuel would solidify on the bottom of the sea, etc. Apuntar la posible responsabilidad penal de determinados funcionarios del Estado español no supone desconocer que puede atribuirse también indiciariamente una responsabilidad de esta índole a aquellas personas que, debido a su comportamiento anterior a la intervención de las autoridades de Fomento, causaron el accidente inicial. Por consiguiente, si se acreditase que dichas personas infringieron el deber de diligencia que personalmente les incumbía, podrían responder penalmente por los delitos imprudentes que hubiesen causado. Of the Captain and other people related to owning and operating the ship. Now, as refers to Captain Mangouras, the developments of the proceeding show that, contrary to what was believed initially, he cannot be charged with the crime of disobedience under article 556.
At the same time, material proof sheds light on two more important aspects: on the one hand the captain cannot be charged with the new and more serious crime of damage to a protected space (art. 330 CP) and his responsibility is limited in this case to the crime under art. 325 for negligence and with a prison sentence of 3 to 6 months being applicable. However, the conduct of the captain can only be qualified as serious negligence with great difficulty since, due to the condition of the ship and what the Spanish authorities took it on themselves to do with it, there is no guarantee that the navigation measures adopted (not easily qualified as “unreasonable” when compared to the Marpol Agreement) may have increased in any significant manner the criminal risk created by the initial accident to the effects of imputing the captian the only ecological crime he could possibly be attributed with (that of article 325 in relation to 331).
As for the responsibility of the people related to the ownership and exploitation of the ship, it is not possible to ignore the attribution of a criminal responsibility for negligence, particularly in the case of the owner and the operator explicitly mentioned in the claims by the Nunca Mais Platform and Izquierda Unida political party. When all is said and done, the criminal responsibility will probably fall on all these people and it would have to be redirected toward a true hypothesis of accessories to negligence since, from the moment of the initial accident we are faced with a succession of a chain of non-compliances. Therefore, it may so happen that the final result may not be objectively imputed to any individual act of negligence or that the concurrence of negligence (among which that – hypothetical - of the captain would have to be evaluated) would have the effect of degrading the “seriousness” of such negligence of some person or people, by which no crime would exist. XXXIV
INVESTIGATION IN THE CENTRAL AND GALICIAN PARLIAMENTS
The party in power, shielding itself with its absolute majority, impeded a proper investigation of the accident-catastrphe, both in the Spanish parliament as in the local Galician parliament.
XXXV INVESTIGATION IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
1. The European Parliament was not allowed to carry out an investigation within Spanish borders but they made a commendable effort to approach the problem. So much so that they have contributed to the European citizen getting a less biased view of the reality in the European shipping industry and the consequences that may be derived from current policies. The “Prestige” is just an example.
2. The European Parliament should propose measures to be adopted that are more efficient to avoid and deal with this kind of accident – in relation to the human factor (on all levels) meticulousness in applying the rules and controlling their application. 3. It would be advisable to establish the foundation in order to produce a convergence of the Member States in matters concerning inspection, rescue and pollution combat at sea. Opening such a process would provide us, with a horizon of about 10 years, with the creation of a European civilian coast guard that would be an authentic support to shipping safety in the European Union.
XXVI REPRISALS
The action taken by the Directorate General of the Merchant Navy against the Chief Engineer of the Ship Inspection Unit of A Coruña, D. Fernando Balbás, deserves our full rejection since he behaved at all times with the meticulousness and honesty required of his public responsibility and post. Since there were no reasons to penalise him for professional reasons, we understand there may be a connection between the processes set up by the DGMN and the statements possibly made by Mr. Balbas to the judge in Corcubión, in relation to the decision to take the “Prestige” offshore.
XXVII THE CREW OF THE “PRESTIGE”
The contracts of the members of the crew show, in relative terms, that the salaries were very low even for the captain, chief engineer and first officer. The hours spent working on board, keeping in mind the harsh nature of the work, in many cases far surpassed the reasonable limits of days on board. The crew, judging by their declarations, became overcome with panic and in consequence was in no condition to face an emergency situation such as that of the “Prestige”.
XXXVIII FEATURES OF THE REPORTS DRAWN UP BY SASEMAR
1. The report presented by SASEMAR based on the data provided by the zonal centre of maritime search and rescue and pollution combat (C.Z.C.S) is incomplete. The director of the center confirmed this. It is imprecise and ambiguous in its language.
2. Plotters.- The plotters provided by SASEMAR show serious signs of unreliability. The absence of precise data on the sequences of the tug “Ría de Vigo” during its presumed approach to the ship on the afternoon of the 13th November around 18:30 (local time) should be investigated by independent technicians.
XXXIX MARITIME ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE
The organisations in charge maritime transport and shipping, at all levels; local, regional, national and international, should reflect deeply into the philosophy applicable to accidents at sea. Up to now they start off from the presumption that those responsible for accidents at sea are the crew members, the ship owners, the port operators, and/or other auxiliary services (pilots, tugs, mooring, fire fighters, etc) leaving publish authorities safe and sound together with their own associate services (agencies, consultants, external advisers, and so on).
It can easily be proved that these circumstances limit the field of responsibilities without any reasons to justify it. Taking the data made available and keeping in mind the direct implication of the merchant marine authority in the “Prestige” accident – the IMO, the EU, Member State governments, regional and local authorities should change, within the scope of their respective competencies, the nature, resources and materials provided to the committees in charge of investigating shipping accidents – that these be made up exclusively of independent, qualified professionals in each are of investigation. In this way the objectivity of their work may be guaranteed. Even in those cases where the governments or their agencies are the object of such investigation.
XL.-FINAL RECOMMENDATION
The organisations in charge maritime transport and shipping, at all levels; local, regional, national and international, should avoid the temptation of accommodating administrative structures and professional qualifications of civil servants and/or technical staff to purely corporate interests. If the personnel on board ship must be chosen according to the agreement on qualifications, training and watch duty at sea (STCW) these same criteria should be applied to the personnel on shore who are to keep a watch on the safety of ships, passengers and cargo at sea whose responsibility by no means should be guaranteed by at least that training, knowledge and professional experience required of that agreement for ships over 1,600 GRT. In other areas related to construction, repair, design and so on, the engineers should be able to have to their credit at least 5 years in tasks at sea or in dry-dock in shipyards.
The IMO, EU and other maritime authorities at the current time lack this type of qualified professional people due to letting political interests and pressure groups direct their contracting policy. Doing things this way such regrettable situations as that of the “ Prestige” may be avoided.
Asociación Española de la Marina Civil